

FROM THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.
The Great Battles near Chattanooga.

The Preliminary Movements of Our Army.

The Battle of Saturday the 19th.

Terrible Slaughter upon Our Left.

OUR LINE CRUSHED AND ROLLED BACK.

Rosecrans Places Batteries and Checks the Rebel Column.

Thomas Advances, Hurling the Rebels Back.

They leave their Dead and Wounded on the Field.

SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON OUR CENTER.

OUR LINE BROKEN AND NEARLY ROUTED.

The Rebels Again Checked and Hurlled Back.

Advances of Our Line and the Position Regained.

THE BATTLE OF SUNDAY THE 20TH.

The renewed Rebel Onslaughts in Heavy Column.

THE YET RAPIDLY FACE A TERRIBLE FIRE.

Defeat imminent to Pierce Our Center.

Our Army Cut in Two and Forced Back.

Unavailing Efforts of Gen. Rosecrans to Stay the Hunt.

Galant Stand Made by 10,000 or 12,000.

FURIOUS FINAL ASSAULT BY THE REBELS.

THEY ARE REPULSED AND ROUTED.

THE RETREAT TO CHATTANOOGA.

OUR LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIAL.

The Army Safe at Chattanooga.

Preparations for the Offensive Again.

RECONNOISSANCE IN FORCE ON THURSDAY.

From Our Special Correspondent.

CINCINNATI, Thursday, Sept. 24, 1863.

As often at sea bright skies and fair winds are changed with frightful storms into dark clouds of gloom and threatening darkness, so has the joyful period of victory and the gladsome prospect of approaching peace, that cheered loyal hearts all but unintermittently since early July, been brought with depressing abruptness to an unexpected close by the disastrous events of early July, when the army, after a long and arduous march, was driven back to Chattanooga, and the army of the Cumberland was again in the hands of the enemy.

Gen. Rosecrans' plan of operations for his third offensive campaign against the Rebel forces under Bragg was identical with that pursued in the second, and terminated with the occupation of Tullahoma, and the retreat of the enemy across the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee. As then, he aimed at the destruction of his adversary, not by a direct attack, but indirectly by a feigned demonstration upon the front of the latter, meant to hold him in his position, and a main movement around his flank, and to his rear and

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lines of communication. He designed not merely to maneuver his enemy out of his position at Chattanooga, and occupy it, but to compel him to fight or surrender, after effecting his isolation from the south.

The plan involving a division of force, its first condition of success, was, as in all turning movements, numerical superiority so great as to insure against the defeat of the army in parts. This Gen. Rosecrans supposed to have, and beyond doubt actually had—the enemy's reinforcements from the East and South-West not having as yet reached Chattanooga—at the time he commenced operations on the south bank of the river. He had the whole of the 14th, 20th and 21st Corps—the former composed of four each of the latter of three divisions—and had furthermore ordered part of the reserve corps to join him. With this force and his knowledge of the strength of Bragg's, he was fully justified in his undertaking.

For the first upon the front of Chattanooga, a force consisting of two brigades of infantry, two of cavalry, and several batteries of artillery, were detached, under command of Gen. Wagner, of Gen. Wood's division. He was to work his way up the north bank of the river with part of his force to the point opposite Chattanooga, visited last year by Gen. Negley, and thence to throw from time to time, shot and shell into the town. With the remainder of his command he was to make a show of intention to cross at various places below Chattanooga. All this, to create the impression that the main body of the army was moving directly upon the place.

Contrary to expectation, the passage of the Tennessee was accomplished in the last days of August and the first of September by crossing at three points—Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Shiloh—without meeting any serious opposition from the enemy. Not a single life was lost. The feints attempted at resistance admitted of two constructions: either Bragg was too weak to defend all the numerous crossings, or he meant to draw our army to the south side bank of the river and beyond, in accordance with a well-conceived plan, which has been developed to us since last week so fully and so fully.

The 14th and 20th corps, under Generals Thomas and McCook, crossed first at Bridgeport and Stevenson, and were ready to move forward from the south bank on the 4th inst. The 21st corps, under Gen. Crittenden, did not get over to a point opposite Shiloh, until the 5th.

And now a brief description of the main topographical features of the scene of the movements to be recorded. The Tennessee river, west of Chattanooga, naturally standing its many windings, has a general course to the south-west. Parallel to it, and close to its south bank, extend the Reunion mountains, a range of rugged ascent and considerable elevation. Its summit is formed by a plateau some twelve miles wide, and slopes off to the south-east, into what is known as Lookout Valley. Lookout Valley begins in the immediate vicinity of Chattanooga, at the base of the famous Lookout Mountain—the highest peak in all this region—and extends almost due south-east for a distance of 45 miles to a point known to the natives as Valley Head. It is about two miles wide, and skirted to the south-east by the Lookout Mountains, running parallel to the Reunion Ridge.

Increasing the Lookout range a second wide plateau has to be traversed after reaching the summit, and then the descent is made into another long, narrow valley, bounded to the south-east by another almost parallel range, called the Missionary Ridge. This again slopes off into a fourth valley, bordered on the opposite side by the Pigeon Mountains.

On the morning of the 3th, the commands of Gen. Thomas and McCook, were in motion over converging roads, and after a long and extremely arduous march across the Reunion Ridge, struck Lookout Valley on the evening of the same day. Gen. Crittenden's corps crossed over from Shiloh on the 4th, and the headquarters of the army also followed, and were established at Trenton.

On the 7th, the lines of the army extended up and down Lookout Valley, from within a few miles of Chattanooga to near "Valley Head"—a distance of some thirty miles. The center, under Thomas, rested North and South of Trenton. The right and left were respectively formed by McCook and Crittenden.

The whole army was provided with ammunition for any likely extent of fighting, and supplies for an entire month, and thus, by the wise precaution of its commander, rendered comparatively independent of its lines of communication for the stated length of time.

A glance at the map will show that the relative location of Chattanooga and Trenton is such as to make the occupation of the latter point tantamount to the flanking of the former. With his army in the Lookout Valley, and controlling the roads leading thence toward the lines of communication and retreat of the enemy, Gen. Rosecrans had partially realized his object in rendering Chattanooga untenable. But, as already stated, he aimed further at working the entire destruction of the enemy by throwing his forces between Chattanooga and their southern avenues of escape. With a view to this end he proposed to employ the main body of his cavalry in breaking, by a sudden descent, the Western and Atlantic Railroad at or near Kingston, and, while the Rebels were thus being cut off, to move the greater part of his infantry rapidly across the successive ridges of mountains into the open country extending from above Dalton to Rome and Kingston, and traversed by the railroad as well as the principal ordinary highways to the South.

There are but three passes through the Lookout Mountains practicable for an army moving with artillery and baggage—on at Chattanooga, the second at Johnson's Creek, eight miles south of Trenton, and the third near the Little town of Winston, not far from the Valley Head. Before the infantry had passed over the Reunion Mountains, Major-Gen. Stanley had been sent with the cavalry across and down Lookout and into the open region washed by the Chattooga and Coosa Rivers, whence he could threaten both Rome and Kingston, and as supposed, cut the railroad. He went to within a day's march of Rome, but in the end failed of his object. Near Alpine, 28 miles north-west of Rome, his advance had a severe skirmish with Wheeler's cavalry, resulting in the rout of the latter.

After the infantry had descended into the Lookout Valley, the right, under McCook, was at once extended to Valley Head so as to secure Winston Pass for the movement before mentioned. The march across the mountains was not at once continued, but the army rested in the Lookout Valley from the 7th until the 9th in order to give the Commander-in-Chief time to gather much needed information in regard to the purposes of the enemy, and the character of the country and roads, as well as to enable the ordnance and supply trains to close up.

Late in the day on the 8th, intelligence was received of the evacuation of Chattanooga by the Rebels. Although not unexpected, the event occurred too early to accord with Gen. Rosecrans' calculations. It imported at once a new aspect to the situation. The question was now no longer to shut in Bragg's army at Chattanooga, but to overtake it in case it should be found making a retreat to beyond striking distance or to fight it in the new position, it might assume.

To develop the truth in the premises, Gen. Rosecrans, upon learning of the abandonment of Chattanooga, forthwith issued orders to put the whole of the infantry in motion across the Lookout Range. The left was to cross at the Gap near Chattanooga, the center at Johnson's Creek, over the road to Lafayette, and the right at

Winston, upon the road to Summerville. The distances between the three Gaps rendered an interruption of communication between the different corps unavoidable during the march over the mountains. They were to re-establish an unbroken line, however, at the eastern base of the range. The three columns were to descend the mountains cautiously, to push rapidly after the enemy, if discovered upon a bona fide retreat, but not to descend into the open country without further orders, if they should be found to resist in force. The corps were all on the march over the stated routes before daylight on the morning of the 9th.

Gen. Rosecrans moved his headquarters from Trenton to Chattanooga on the 11th. The information obtained there must have satisfied him that Bragg had not made a precipitate retreat, but had evidently long prepared for it. The fact, now positively ascertained, that Bragg's command and part of Johnston's army had joined him, afforded, moreover, stronger support to the theory that he did not mean to retreat far, but had simply, with commendable prudence, exchanged a dangerous position for one in which he ran no risk of being isolated from the South. This presumption was soon verified by the experience of Gen. Thomas.

McCook reached the base of the Southern extremity of the Lookout Mountains and camped at Alpine, in the valley of the Chattooga, 28 miles, as already given, north-west of Rome, on the road to Summerville, on the evening of the 10th. In compliance with his orders, he did not advance further, but occupied himself for several days with reconnaissance, which failed to disclose the presence of the enemy in any considerable strength in his front. His corps served also as support to the cavalry, which was still scouring the country in every direction. Mounted detachments managed to scout within five miles of Rome, without coming across an enemy. They learned, however, that the town was defended by several thousand Georgia militia.

The Lookout range extends in a southerly direction beyond the Missionary Ridge. The Pigeon Mountains run into the former to the southward, forming an angle including the latter. While Gen. McCook gained the open country by crossing the Lookout range alone, the route Gen. Thomas was ordered to take compelled him to cross all the mentioned ridges. His march over the Lookout and Mission Mountains was obstructed by the enemy. But his advance, consisting of the division of Gen. Negley, after traversing the valley separating the Mission and Pigeon Mountains, and while ascending toward the Gaps through them, on the 11th, found itself suddenly confronted and opened on with musketry and artillery from the heights, by a large force of the enemy. Being too far ahead for ready support, by the other divisions of the corps, he deemed it best to fall back to the Gap, through which he had descended Winston Ridge. His loss in this affair was about 40 killed and wounded. Gen. Thomas, upon arriving in front, was likewise convinced, that serious bodies of Rebel troops were before him and prepared to cover Lafayette by disputing the passage of the Pigeon Mountains determinedly, and hence concluded to rest his command on Mission Ridge until Gen. Rosecrans could be informed of the state of affairs.

While Gen. McCook and Thomas were marching over the Lookout Range, Gen. Crittenden had also pushed across them, having Chattanooga a few miles to his left, and moved southward, upon the roads to Lafayette and Ringgold, after being joined by Wood's division, of his corps, which had entered Chattanooga. On the 12th, his right opened communication with Gen. Thomas's left.

Gen. Thomas's report of the barrier to his progress to Lafayette, by the Rebel occupation, in strong force of the gaps through the Pigeon Mountains, together with developments at other points of our lines, and the statements of deserters and citizens, satisfied Gen. Rosecrans that the enemy, emboldened by powerful reinforcements, were bent upon fighting rather than retreating. There being indications that they were rapidly moving their entire force into a position adapted to both attack and defense, he perceived at once that the change in the situation had to be met by a concentration of his army upon the center, and he took his measures without delay accordingly.

Gen. McCook was ordered to abandon his rather exposed position at Alpine, from which he could neither support Thomas nor be supported by him; retrace his steps to the Lookout Valley, and thence follow in the wake of Gen. Thomas, and pass from his rear to his right. The cavalry, under Gen. Stanley, was also ordered back for service upon the new front of the army. Gen. Crittenden was directed to move up West Chickamauga Creek, and close up with the left of the center. The Commander-in-Chief himself left Chattanooga on the 13th, and established his headquarters in close proximity to the front.

On the 12th, the corps of Gen. Crittenden and Thomas were in line, and on the morning of the same day Gen. McCook's reached its starting point in the Lookout Valley. On the 13th, it was also in its proper position. The line extended from right to left along the West Chickamauga up to McLemore's Cove—a local designation for the long, narrow, wooded valleys by which this region abounds—formed by the Pigeon and Lookout Mountains. Being protected by the West Chickamauga in front, and resting upon a ridge of mountains, the roads over which to their secondary base at Bridgeport, where it was strong in itself, but weak in its relation to our lines of communication. It covered our intermediate depot of supplies at the railroad terminus at Bridgeport, but at the same time the wide gap left between the nearest wing of the army and Chattanooga exposed our lines of communication from Bridgeport through the latter town—the route the wagon trains followed—and invited turning maneuvers. Still, the relative advantages and disadvantages of our position will depend in a great measure upon the strength of the enemy. It was certainly the best position that could be assumed in adaptation to the front shown by the enemy. For one, facing south in close proximity to Chattanooga, although, perhaps, covering the town better, would give the enemy control of the shorter roads across the Lookout Mountains to Bridgeport, and a fine opportunity to play the same game upon us that we practiced upon Bragg, by throwing a flanking column to the rear. The strategic advantages of Chattanooga appear, indeed, to have been overestimated. The southern sweep of the course of the Tennessee takes in its vicinity renders it almost impossible to protect the place from being trapped.

While we faced the Pigeon Mountains from their western base, the main body of the enemy rested at their eastern, in the vicinity of Lafayette. Their advance held three passes—Cattletts, Dug, and Bluffs Gaps, leading from our front over the ridge. Their position was well chosen and strong, and none the less advantageous from the railroad facilities they enjoyed to their very front. In this respect they had a great start of us.

Exception occasional exchange of shots between the pickets, no hostilities occurred between the opposed forces until the morning of the 17th, when the enemy twice drove in our pickets on the left, but retired quickly upon the advance of the support of the latter. Gen. Rosecrans, although prepared for and expecting battle, was not anxious to bring it on. His expected reinforcements from the reserve corps of Gen. Burnside had not all reached him. But, above all, it may be supposed that the intelligence of the arrival and disembarkation of troops from Virginia, and to belong to Longstreet's corps, at Indian station, a few miles from Lafayette, brought by deserters on the 16th and 17th, made him despondent, in the face of the numerical superiority thus apparently given to the enemy, to be attacked in his own chosen position rather than to seek the enemy.

The accession of Eastern troops to the Rebel army in our front, afforded additional proof of the discouraging truth, developed clearer from day to day last week, that the Rebel Generals have been acting throughout this campaign upon a masterly plan, and were about trying a great stroke of strategy. The humiliating reflection, that the folly of the managers of the War in Washington alone enabled them to essay it by allowing or forcing the center of our general base of operations, represented by Gen. Rosecrans and Gen. Burnside's armies, to take the offensive, while the right and left—Grant's and Meade's armies—to be idle, forces itself irresistibly upon one's mind.

(Concluded by Telegraph.) In the course of the 17th, already unmistakable signs indicated that the enemy had discovered the weak points of our position, and were massing their forces in front of one left-center and left, for the manifest purpose of crushing those parts of our lines, or getting between them and Chattanooga. A corresponding movement by the left flank was thence made by the whole army further down the West Chickamauga, so that on Friday morning our extreme left rested at Gordon's Mill, at the crossing of the Chickamauga by the Lafayette Pike, about twelve miles south-west of Chattanooga. On the morning of the 18th (Friday), a portion of the expected reinforcements, consisting of two brigades of the reserve corps, respectively commanded by Cols. McCook and Mitchell, made their appearance near Chattanooga, and were immediately ordered to make a reconnaissance toward Ringgold, and develop the intentions of the enemy from that quarter.

They came upon the advance of Longstreet's corps, pushed it back for some distance, took a number of prisoners from it, and fully established the anticipated concentration of the enemy in front of our left. All day Friday the cavalry, covering our front, skirmished with different bodies of the enemy issuing from the various gaps of the Pigeon Mountains and advancing upon and again retreating from our line. No serious collision, however, occurred. It was evident the Rebel generals meant to create a false impression as to the points of our line against which they proposed to strike a blow with concentrated power. But Gen. Rosecrans was not deceived. The reports from the front all tended to confirm his previous impression that an onset in overwhelming numbers was contemplated upon our left flank, and that it had to be met by a still further shifting line toward Chattanooga.

Accordingly on Friday night the divisions of Brannan and Baird, formerly commanded by Gen. Rosecrans and Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, together with Johnson's of McCook's corps, moved from the center to the left of Crittenden's corps. They were in their new positions at daybreak. The two other divisions of McCook's corps, Davis's and Sheridan's, were to move into the position abandoned by Thomas's corps, but had not time to assume it fully before the commencement of the action on the next morning. On the morning of Saturday our line then appeared as follows: On the extreme left Brannan, next Baird and Reynolds, the Sheridan's divisions, faced a little east of south. The line of the center, Palmer and the right of Reynolds, and Van Cleve on his left. The line, as already stated, was to be completed by Davis's and the Sheridan's divisions, faced a little east of south. The line of the center, Palmer and the right of Reynolds, and Van Cleve on his left. The line, as already stated, was to be completed by Davis's and the Sheridan's divisions, faced a little east of south. The line of the center, Palmer and the right of Reynolds, and Van Cleve on his left. The line, as already stated, was to be completed by Davis's and the Sheridan's divisions, faced a little east of south.

The section of the valley bordered by the two roads is almost a plain, covered with thick woods, which rendered the field unfavorable for the effective use of artillery. The line proper, as given above, rested nearly at the base of the Missionary Mountains, some distance in advance of its right. Gordon's Mills, the point of intersection of the road from Chattanooga to Lafayette and the Chickamauga aforementioned, was still held on Saturday morning by Wood's division of Crittenden's corps, supported by Negley's of Thomas's. Their position was a strong one; but, at an angle with the line proper, appeared like a dangerous extension of the latter, and was proved such by subsequent events. It was meant to secure our right against turning maneuvers, but officers of good judgment entertained the belief that both greater compactness from closer contraction and perfect security of the right might have been obtained by posting the latter on the eastern abutments of Missionary Ridge. The brigades of McCook and Mitchell of the reserve corps were ordered back to Rossville, on Friday afternoon, for the protection of our communication with Chattanooga, and hence were not to participate in the struggle of Saturday. The night had been frosty, and the troops not being permitted to kindle bivouac fires, the discomfort they experienced, together with the fatigue from marching and want of sleep, put them in a physical condition by no means as vigorous as it should have been for the severe work before them. Fortunately the sun rose clear, and, with its cheering rays, did much to revive the spirits of the army.

The early morning passed away without forewarning of the approaching conflict, but shortly before 11 o'clock the storm that had been brewing all the morning on the Rebel side burst forth in the expected direction. At that time a long mass of Rebel infantry was seen advancing upon Brannan's division on the extreme left. It first came upon the second brigade, Col. Croston commanding, and soon forced it back despite its determined resistance. The two other brigades of the division at once came to its assistance, and succeeded in checking the progress of the Rebels and driving them back; but their column being in turn strongly reinforced, they advanced again with wild yells. So powerful was this assault that they pushed Brannan back to and beyond his position in the line, and thus uncovered the left of Baird's division. Making prompt use of their advantage, they changed their course to the left, and speedily enveloped Sheridan's and King's brigades—the latter of regulars. They were almost surrounded, but managed to disentangle themselves after fearful loss.

The crushing Rebel masses next came upon Johnson's Division, and rolled it upon Reynolds's, which also came speedily involved in the desperate struggle. The stubborn resistance of these divisions, however, and the sweeping fire of some batteries posted under the personal supervision of Gen. Rosecrans, arrested at last their sweeping advance.

The divisions of Brannan and Baird having been rallied, Gen. Thomas ordered a general advance of the right, and soon the tide of battle was decidedly turned in our favor. With cheers our line advanced, halting only at times to shatter the enemy with musketry. Several times the latter's retreating line stopped and vainly tried to retain their gained ground; but steadily they were driven from position to position, and by 4 o'clock all the ground lost was nearly recovered. Several batteries belonging to Gen. Baird's and Brannan's Divisions, whose horses had been killed and supports were swept away, were retaken, and several hundred prisoners captured. The enemy left all their dead and nearly all their wounded on the field. There were at least 500 of the former. The Rebels troops engaging Thomas belonged to Brannan's and Longstreet's commands.

At the time the struggle was turning in our favor on the left, Bragg's army proper, consisting of the corps of Polk and Hill (formerly Hardee's), moved to a most determined and well-executed attack upon Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions in the center. Its object was obviously to relieve the defeated Rebel right. Palmer and Van Cleve soon found themselves overpowered and their

divisions breaking. Their complete rout was imminent, when Davis's division came to their support on Van Cleve's right. The timely reinforcements at first had the effect of checking the enemy and restoring our line; but the Rebel attack was speedily renewed with greater numbers, and the center again compelled to yield. Davis was forced to the right and Van Cleve to the left, and the enemy advanced through the opening made in our line, threatening to take the center and right by their flanks, as they had done on the left. At this critical juncture Sheridan's division appeared, and was at once thrown upon the enemy. It stood its ground gallantly for a while, but becoming soon exposed to a destructive flank fire, was also compelled to fall back. Fortunately, the divisions of Gens. Wood and Negley, which had been easily withdrawn from Gordon's Mills when the Rebel attack on the left threatened to be successful, now came to the rescue. After a brief contest, the Rebels found themselves at last matched, and commenced giving away in their turn, Reynolds having also been sent to the assistance of the center.

After the repulse of the Rebel right, an advance was ordered and the original position regained about sunset. About dark the enemy made another demonstration, with a heavy artillery and musketry fire upon the center, but eliciting a lively response, they soon abandoned this last effort of the day. Thus ended the battle of the 19th. It had been a defensive one on our part, and although we lost no ground, and probably less men and material than the enemy, its result could hardly be claimed as a triumph of Union arms. No substantial advantage had been won, and a large portion of the army was badly shattered. That the enemy, with his numerical superiority, would be able to offer again battle on the following day, could well be supposed. Gen. Rosecrans anticipated a renewal of the struggle, and prepared for it.

During the night the disposition of our forces was changed. The line was made to rest along a cross-road running north-east and south-west, and connecting the Rossville and Lafayette roads. By this disposition, our extreme right was made to rest on Missionary Ridge. The new line was a mile shorter than that of the day before. The different divisions were disposed in this order: From right to left, one brigade of Negley's, Johnson's, Baird's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, two brigades of Negley's, Wood's, Sheridan's, and Davis's. Brannan's and Van Cleve's formed the reserve. The mounted brigades of Wilder and Mitty covered the right flank. Sunday morning broke upon the hostile armies as fair as that of the preceding day. Contrary to our universal expectation on our side, the enemy again altered the early hours, so well suited to offensive maneuvers, to pass away undisturbed by the sounds of battle. The adaptation of their plan of attack to our new line doubtless necessitated this. About 9 o'clock a few shots were heard at various points of our front, but it was only at a little before ten that the report of whole volleys announced the resumption of the fight in good earnest. The firing that had begun upon our left, at once resumed the fiercest character. The enemy repeated the tactics of the previous day by throwing themselves first upon our extreme left, formed by Gen. Davis's brigade of Negley's division. It stood the onset for some time, but finally retired.

Desiring to unite the two portions of Gen. Negley's command, Gen. Rosecrans ordered Gen. Wood's division to take the position of the two brigades stationed further to the right. The Rebels, perceiving the withdrawal of Negley, and believing it to be a retreat, moved forward, and the action speedily became general. Finding themselves unable to make an impression on Wood, the enemy, after the lapse of an hour or so, seemed to concentrate their main strength upon the center, and commenced by a success.

During the night, our troops had constructed along the line barriers of logs and fence rails, and thus comparatively sheltered, they kept a continuous, murderous musketry fire upon the enemy. Our artillery was planted upon higher ground in the rear, and fired over the heads of the enemy, and believing it to be a retreat, moved forward, and the action speedily became general. Finding themselves unable to make an impression on Wood, the enemy, after the lapse of an hour or so, seemed to concentrate their main strength upon the center, and commenced by a success.

Meantime, as Gen. Reynolds was severely pressed, Gen. Wood was ordered to march instantly by the left flank, pass Brannan, and go to his relief. Davis and Sheridan were to shift over the left, and thus close up the line. As the occasion was urgent, Gen. Wood drew in his skirmishers with considerable haste, and the Rebels, for the second time, mistaking a withdrawal for a flight, pressed forward like a torrent, and poured musketry, canister, and grape into the flank of the division, moving upon the double-quick. The men endeavored for a time to keep their files in order, but as the pitiless storm of lead and iron continued to be hurled against them, the regiments began to spread out like a fan wider and wider until finally they were torn to shreds. This was especially the case with the brigade commanded by Col. Beall. Parker's brigade alone passed on to its destination comparatively intact.

The battle now extended upon its most critical phase. The breaks, temporarily caused by the shifting of divisions from one point of the line to another, were so promptly perceived and turned to advantage by the enemy, that they proved fatal, and cost the loss of the day. Davis's Division, coming up to take Wood's position on the extreme left, was taken with great suddenness and fury by the left flank, and pushed to the right in utter disorder. Simultaneously the weak remnants of Van Cleve's and Palmer's Divisions, exposed by the withdrawal of Davis's, were attacked with equal vehemence on the right, and forced back in great confusion. The rout of the left and the right was now complete, and even the exertions of Gen. Rosecrans and his staff, who, with drawn swords, endeavored to restore order, were of no avail. Streams of demoralized, uncontrollable men, fleeing toward the rear, were all that remained of a large portion of the army.

After that fatal break, our line of battle was not again reformed during the day. The army was, in fact, cut in two, McCook, with Davis, Sheridan, and Wilder, being thrown off to the right; Crittenden, except one brigade of Wood's, being broken in pieces, and Thomas, with his indomitable corps, and Johnson's division of McCook's, remaining alone upon the left. Thomas's divisions—Negley's, Brannan's, and Baird's—had been fearfully shaken and much scattered by the fight over the log works, and Reynolds's was the only one that retired in tolerable order. Retreat was now the only left, and the whole disorganized mass of our troops fell back over the road to Rossville. Crowds of stragglers, in mob-like disorder, made good speed toward Chattanooga, with the exception of Sheridan, Davis, and Wilder, who, cut off, from the center, still struggled as best they could.

On the right the divisions of Baird, Reynolds, Negley and Brannan, and Harker's brigade of Wood's division, alone retained cohesiveness, and took a position along the base of Missionary Mountains, where the Rossville road debouches from them, for another fight. The line was formed so that the left rested upon the Lafayette road, and the right at the gap represented an arc of a circle, and a south-east hill about its center formed the key to the position. Between 2 and 3 o'clock the enemy appeared on the Lafayette road, and, moving by the left flank, soon found themselves overpowered and their

At first they directed a heavy fire of musketry and artillery upon our position, as though meaning to dispirit its defenders before coming to an assault, but the 10,000 or 12,000 men that confronted them felt that the fate of the Army of the Cumberland, and, in a great measure, that of the Union, depended upon the repulse of the enemy, and when the Rebel lines finally came repeatedly to the attack, they advanced but to recoil with severe loss. Our troops were formed in two lines upon the crest, and, firing one after the other, they kept up an unbroken fusillade with telling effect. The enemy, consisting of Polk's corps, were not only repelled, but thrown into such disorder that Turchin's brigade and other portions of the line followed, and took several hundred prisoners. Toward sunset the enemy were driven back to the position they took when flung out of the Lafayette road, and abandoned the contest.

When Thomas's Division were most sorely pressed during the afternoon, and it looked at one time as though they would again have to succumb to superior numbers, they were gladdened and encouraged by the advent, on the right, of Mitchell's and Whitaker's Brigades, of the reserve corps, under the command of Gen. Gordon Granger, himself. With the accession of strength, our ability to maintain our position was no longer doubted. Soon after Gen. Granger had reported to Gen. Thomas, his two brigades were sent out on the road, under command of Gen. Steadman, to retake an ammunition train that had fallen into the hands of the enemy. They came upon a large Rebel force, and after a severe conflict, drove them away.

While Gen. Thomas was making his gallant fight, Sheridan and Davis had managed, after being much cut up, to work their way to the Rossville road with the remnants of their divisions, and fallen back in the direction of Chattanooga. At night Gen. Thomas fell back to Rossville, four miles from Chattanooga, after bringing away all the wounded, transportation, and other material within reach.

While the struggle of Saturday ended in a drawn battle, that of Sunday resulted in a disastrous defeat. The failure of the first day was partly due to the greater numerical strength of the enemy, and partly to the deficient formation of our line of battle. That of the second is justly ascribed to improper tactics on the battlefield, and above all to the absence of command. The inspiring example set and influence exercised by the Commander-in-Chief at Stone River were wanting—he having been compelled to leave the field and return to Chattanooga before the action was over.

The early disappearance of two corps commanders from the field also made a demoralizing impression. The loyal people certainly have cause for self-congratulation that the Army of the Cumberland was not completely destroyed, and owes profound gratitude to Gen. Thomas and those under him that saved it. Our losses are great. That in killed, wounded, and missing will probably reach ten thousand. Of artillery, we are less than fifty pieces, mostly lost on Sunday. Of wagons, loaded with ammunition and supplies, ambulances, &c., we have also lost a great number. They were abandoned in the retreat on Sunday.

Gen. Rosecrans and his lieutenants were busily engaged on Monday in strengthening their position by field works, and reorganizing their commands. While the army itself may be considered safe enough, it is most certain that if the enemy have the advantage of greater numbers, flanking movements will compel Rosecrans to retreat across the Tennessee, in case reinforcements should not promptly reach him.

Latest Official Advice. WASHINGTON, Friday, Sept. 25, 1863. Telegrams up to 2 o'clock yesterday afternoon, from Gen. Rosecrans, give additional assurance that his position can be assumed only by regular siege.

The purpose of Gen. Rosecrans seems to be to resume offensive operations as soon as the reinforcements, including Gen. Burnside's troops, now on the way, reach him. The mass of the Rebel infantry are in Chattanooga Creek Valley. A division of Rebel cavalry advanced yesterday, on the day before, from Stevenson's Gap, threatening a Union regiment guarding one of our signal stations, whereupon the regiment in question retired from its isolated position, in the extreme front, before it could be attacked.

Gen. Rosecrans will venture a prompt attack upon him, but is of opinion that it will not be made. All was quiet about his lines at 9 p. m. yesterday.

A telegram from Gen. Rosecrans, dated last night, says he made a reconnaissance in force along the enemy's lines yesterday afternoon, and found him in force. The enemy did not resist the advance of our reconnoitering column, which returned to its quarters after having accomplished the object of the movement, which proved to be of considerable importance.

Reports from Louisville. LOUISVILLE, Friday, Sept. 25, 1863. Scraps of information from passengers just arrived lead to the belief that Sherman's corps from Grant's army joined Rosecrans on Tuesday or Wednesday, and that Burnside's corps has more recently effected a junction at Grape Vine.

Reports prevalent to-night on the street say that Burnside's force has been captured; but nothing has passed over the wires today indicating such an event, and it is undoubtedly false.

Remarkable Article from The Richmond Whig—The Necessity for Crushing the Army of the Cumberland—Bragg's Victory a Haven One.

FORRESTER MONROE, Friday, Sept. 25, 1863. The Richmond Whig of Sept. 23 has been received. Its editorial claims a victory in Northern Georgia for Gen. Bragg, but in conclusion says: "We suppress exultation at the thought of what yet remains to be done, and the possibility of losing all that has been gained by failing to complete the work. "Situated as Rosecrans is, the victory that does not disperse or capture his whole army is a lost opportunity. If he is permitted to hold Chattanooga, then our victory will be without profit, and we have only to mourn that so many brave men have died in vain, and chiefly that the gallant Hood has sealed his faith with his blood. "Rosecrans must not only be beaten in battle, but he must be destroyed or driven from East Tennessee; otherwise the battle had as well not been fought. If this stronghold is not wrested from him now, it will hardly be hereafter. If he holds it, he holds a point d'appui from which he may at any moment strike at the very vitals of the Confederacy. He holds a region pestilential with disaffection, that needs only the presence of a Yankee army to ripen into full-blown treason. "He holds the country that must supply meat for our army, inter for our powder-mills, and coal and iron for many of our manufacturing establishments. The possession of that country is of indispensable necessity to us. It is the prize for which Bragg is contending. Until he has won it, we can but rejoice with fear and trembling over what he has done. Should he win, it will be the superlative achievement of the war."

The Care for the Wounded at Chattanooga. Mr. Bellows, President of the U. S. Sanitary Commission, has been notified that twenty additional agents of the Commission have gone to Chattanooga, that stores are going forward in large quantities, and that everything possible is being done to alleviate the sufferings of our wounded.

COL. W. G. JONES.—Col. W. G. Jones, who died of his wounds at Chattanooga on the 20th inst., commanded the 30th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He was about 28 years old, graduated at West Point three years ago, and was one of the Regular officers captured in Texas in 1861. He commanded a Pennsylvania regiment during the Peninsular campaign, and served with great credit during the seven days' battles. He was afterward one of Gen. Sumner's staff until that General's death, when he became Colonel of the 34th Ohio, at whose head he received the wound of which he has since died. He was a good soldier and a gallant gentleman.